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This article explores the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia, the state-build-
ing process in Slovenia and the context of the specific phenomenon – the erasure 
that took place in Slovenia in the early 1990s. It reconstructs the socio-historic 
and political contexts in which the independence of Slovenia occurred. While 
describing the state-building process, the process of democratisation and the di-
lemmas about minority protection in Slovenia – including the distinction be-
tween the recognised “autochthonous” minorities and the non-recognised “new” 
minorities – it paves the ground for theoretical and sociological discussion of the 
“erased”. The theoretical discussion is based on the questions of human rights, 
nationalism and citizenship, both in its classic (nation-state) conception and its 
alternative forms such as global citizenship. Sociologically, it places the “eras-
ure” into a broader frame of investigating the processes of democratisation and 
Europeanisation, thus highlighting the key factors that caused the perforation of 
Slovene democracy in its twenty years of independence.
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Introduction
With the notion of “perforated democracy” we want to point to the holes 
in democracy, thus, the areas where democracy is leaking, where there is 
a deficiency in democracy.* The most sensitive time, when democracy is 
facing a challenge of shortcomings, is the transition between different po-
litical and social regimes, during a time of rapid socioeconomic change and 
* This paper is the result of the research project “The Challenges of Europeanisation: 
Mediating between National and European Identities in South Eastern Europe” (SEUM, 
2010–2011), which has been carried out with the support of the ASO (Austrian Science 
and Research Liaison Office), Ljubljana (www.seumproject.eu).
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political, religious, and cultural ferment (Alvis, 2005; Lockard, 2008). In its 
rather short history as an independent state, Slovenia went through many 
such challenging processes, namely the disintegration of the former Yugo-
slavia, with achieved independence in 1991, the state-building in the early 
1990s, and the Europeanisation that culminated in 2004 with the joining 
of the European Union. The democratisation of Slovenia was widely per-
ceived as non-problematic; in the broader transnational political arena the 
country’s move towards independence was even used as a model, since it 
did not lead to similar wars as elsewhere in the collapsing Yugoslav region. 
But for a large group of people, Slovenian independence was not a success 
story. To the contrary, close to 25,000 people who were “erased” from the 
permanent residents register experienced the move toward democracy as a 
total deprivation of their human rights. In our analysis, we provide a socio-
logical reflection of the processes of disintegration of Yugoslavia and the 
subsequent state-building and Europeanisation of Slovenian society. We use 
this reflection as the explanatory frame to trace the very act of the erasure; 
and the ideological contexts that turned a brief administrative “mistake” 
into a long and devastating agony for the erased – and for democracy in 
post-Yugoslav Slovenia. This has been done on the basis of putting together 
various primary and secondary sources, which are reconstructed with the 
socio-historical method to provide a sociological narrative of the “perfo-
rated democracy”.
1. Disintegration of Yugoslavia and state-building in Slovenia
At the dawn of establishment of socialist Yugoslavia, people of different 
nations came together to form a stronger, multinational political unit, which 
was seen to bring more benefits than smaller weak states trying to recover 
from the experience of the Second World War. Four decades later, follow-
ing the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980, Yugoslavia encountered numer-
ous social, economical, political, ethnic and other problems, accompanied 
by the new geopolitical uncertainties. In 1989, radical political changes 
occurred in Eastern Europe, associated with the liberalisation of the au-
thoritarian regimes and systems, and with the erosion of political power 
in all the so-called Warsaw Pact countries. According to official sources, 
hundreds of enterprises declared bankrupcy, and more than half a million 
people lost their jobs in Yugoslavia in 1989 alone. The atmosphere of social 
despair and hopelessness was widespread. It was clear that Yugoslavia as a 
state could not overcome these problems without a serious transformation 
of its political and economic system. Several ideas of how to overcome the 
emerging crises were put forward, including decentralisation, introduction 
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of a multiparty system and free elections; the communist (and nationalist) 
core of Serbian leadership, backed by the high ranks of the Yugoslav Peo-
ple’s Army, rejected the suggestions for an alternative development, trying 
to preserve the status quo. This led into the federal republics’ attempts to 
gain independence, where Slovenia was followed by the Croatian, Macedo-
nian and Bosnian response. When the first democratic elections were held 
in Slovenia in April 1990, the Yugoslav leadership, instead of continuing 
the dialogue, decided to use armed force to prevent the processes of de-
mocratisation and disintegration of the federal state (Ramet, 1996; Glenny, 
1996; Bebler, 2010).1
Yugoslavia, being a multinational state, was witnessing tensions be-
tween twofold loyalties, loyalty to a federal state on the one hand and 
one’s own national community on the other. Keeping the balance between 
the two was one of the most challenging tasks in Yugoslavia – a task 
that central authorities could not handle. As we read in Matić (2006: 267), 
communism determined the identity of Yugoslavia, according to which the 
loyalty to the state equalled loyalty to communist ideology.2 However, the 
communist idea started to lose its appeal throughout the years. National 
(communist) elites could not find a common language on how to resolve 
the crisis; during the turbulence of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
shift from Yugoslav (transnational, unitary, socialist ideology and identity) 
towards (ethno)nationalistic sentiments took place.
Processes of democratisation in Slovenia were largely accompanied by 
the process of re-nationalisation – Slovenia followed the “ethnic” model of 
state-building. Despite emerging democratic structures, (certain) minority 
groups in the newly formed state were being exposed to discrimination. 
One can prove such discrimination on several cases; while Italian and Hun-
garian minorities were widely financed and supported by the state, some 
other groups were not as generously awarded.3 Giving a proper civic status 
1 For detailed information on the disintegration of federal Yugoslavia, and political proc-
esses from the death of President Tito to interethnic wars, see also: Janjić, 1992; Fink-
Hafner, 1995.
2 Walker Connor writes that to maintain the multinational states one must keep the balance 
between the two types of loyalty, loyalty to the nation and loyalty to the state – so in a 
situation when these two loyalties come into conflict, loyalty to the state loses the battle 
(Connor, 1994: 81).
3 For instance, the unofficial Muslim minority (predominatly of Bosnian origin) has been 
waiting for almost four decades to being allowed by state authorities to build its first 
mosque in Slovenia. As the same time, the Serbian ethnic/religious minority (again unof-
ficial) was waiting for more then two decades to obtain permission to build the Orthodox 
cultural centre in the capital of Slovenia. Not to mention the obstacles for Roma com-
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to the autochthonous “old” minorities, Slovenia forgot about other groups, 
specifically those belonging to other Yugoslav republics. The implied as-
sumption was that granting protection to the existing legally recognised 
minorities would block any possible ethnic conflicts in the future, while 
human rights would be observed.
Therefore, when speaking of minority issues, the political and legal 
discourse focused only on the pre-existing minorities, called “old”, indig-
enous, and also “autochthonous”.4 As Rizman reminds us, “the Council of 
Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, Álvaro Gil-Robles during his 
visit in 2003 already suggested to the Slovene government to get rid of dis-
tinction between autochthonous and non-autochthonous national minorities. 
[…] it can still be said that all Slovenian governments ignored the issue 
and just mentioned advice” (Rizman, 2006: 129).
Article 5 of the Constitution specifically names solely the Italian and 
Hungarian minorities as protected national minorities. Only once in the 
Constitution is the word “minorities” (manjšine) used and it is in specific 
reference to the autochthonous minorities. Not once does the Constitution 
mention the protection of any other minorities, such as minorities from the 
former republics of Yugoslavia. Article 64 of the Constitution protects the 
right of autochthonous minorities to use national symbols and keep national 
identity cards; it grants them the right to education and schooling in their 
own languages. These rights are not guaranteed to the new minorities; le-
gally invisible, the new minorities therefore do not exist in the political 
vocabulary or in state institutions. However, as we will see below, they do 
have a place in the national imaginary where they play an ambiguous role 
as the (un)wanted residue from Yugoslav history.
Discrimination as a form of ethnocentrism was prevalent throughout the 
history of independent Slovenia. The presence of inhabitants and workers 
from other former Yugoslav republics, who were perceived as remainders 
of the common Yugoslav history, was seen as an instrument of “Yugoslavi-
sation” of Slovenia, which wanted to distance itself as much as possible 
from its Balkan neighbourhood, and “returned home, to the company of 
munities, whose minority status was excluded from the Slovene Constitution, (providing 
only the status of an ethnic community), and while the Constitution required the “umbrella 
law” on the Roma ethnic community, such law has been adopted only in March 2007. To 
see more on the situation of the Roma community see http://www.uvn.gov.si/en/minorities/
roma_community/.
4 Due to its arbitrary nature, the term “autochthonous” is no longer used in EU documents 
in regard to national and ethnic minorities. In this sense, Slovenia is an exception (Kralj, 
2009: 2).
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western European nations, to where it has always belonged, by virtue of 
culture, history and civilization” (Petrović, 2009: 10). All traces of former 
shared Yugoslav history thus needed to be removed from the society for it 
to make the transition successfully into a modern European national state. 
Europeanisation was thus seen as separation from the Yugoslav legacy, and 
not as a possible result of democratisation.
In his article on nations, identity, and conflict, Jonathan Glover writes 
that “nationality is often thought of as something ‘natural’ or presocial 
[...] naturalness is reinforced by stories nations often have about their own 
antiquity. But some historians and social scientists emphasize the relative 
modernity of the European nation-states, dating them from around the end 
of the eighteenth century” (Glover, 1997: 12).5 We see a replica of this 19th 
century model reiterated in Slovenia of the late 20th century. Driven by the 
collective enthusiasm of forming an independent state, the national elites 
in Slovenia exaggerated the need for homogeneity. The discourse they em-
ployed stressed the need to disassociate society culturally and historically 
from its recent, post-World War II socialist past and embark on a path of 
development, which would eradicate traces of multicultural and multiethnic 
formula of collective identity building. The immigrants from former Yugo-
slavia, being a historical reminder of the past of which Slovenia was once 
consensually a part, begun to play the convenient role of the ethnic “fifth 
column” (Kymlicka, 2007) within the emerging independent national soci-
ety. With its presence, the immigrant subject from the former Yugoslavia 
of multiethnic and transcultural and transborder “brotherhood and unity” 
destabilised the certainty of the nationalist discourse, which claimed that 
ethnocultural homogeneity can be the only proper base of national loyalty. 
To grant this subject legal protection would not only mean granting him 
public visibility but, at the symbolic level, also an acceptance of Yugoslav 
history as a factor in the identity-building of the hegemonic Slovenian na-
tional subject. Therefore, obliteration of the fact of the existence of the 
immigrants and the need for their legal protection as minorities conven-
iently served several purposes at once. Of these, the symbolic neglect of 
their legal group status may not have been the most violent one in terms 
of their political representations; but it most certainly was the most force-
ful in terms of public legitimation of their exclusion from the bonds of the 
national society.
When Anthony D. Smith was making observations on Yugoslavia in 
1981 he noticed how Slovenia (and Croatia) enjoyed “higher living stand-
5 Here, good references for further reading are also Anderson (1995) and Gellner (1983).
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ards than a preponderantly agricultural, and rather backward, Serb core area. 
And yet, Slovene and especially Croat discontent and desire for greater au-
tonomy, even in federal Yugoslavia, remain powerful political forces. Eth-
nic groups in economically advantaged regions [...] are just as susceptible 
to violent ethnic protest movements as those which inhabit backward areas” 
(Smith, 1981: 29). With Smith, we can argue that aggressive nationalism 
in economically advanced states is no less a potent tool of mobilisation of 
social fears than is the case in underdeveloped countries. In fact, Slovene 
political elites skilfully employed popular perceptions of the continuing 
economic exhausting of vital economic powers of the North by the South 
in post-Tito Yugoslavia. Whereas this is not the place to discuss how the 
uneven development in Yugoslavia was an actual source for the national 
political and economic elites in maintaining their position of power, it is 
important to link this ideological sentiment with the stigmatisation of the 
immigrants as the prolongation of this past practice of exhaustion within 
the now independent, post-Yugoslav state.
To sum up, the process of democratisation and state-building in Slov-
enia was perceived by the international community as an exemplary model 
of transition into the new social and political order. However, while the 
commitments to form a democratic state, based on the protection of human 
rights, and the accepted legislation, were publicly and legally articulated, 
the reality in many regards was far from the declared model. Daniele Con-
versi writes that “[a]ny process of nation-building insensitive to ethnic nu-
ances and local subjectivities implies a parallel process of nation-destroying 
among minority groups” (2003: 3). This statement can be used to describe 
the process in Slovenia, namely the process of state building based on par-
allel construction and destruction of legacies, which could make the immi-
grant minorities a legitimate and autonomous (civic) national subject. While 
Slovenian political elites turned to pre-World War I history to revive the 
allegedly true and authentic ethnic substance of the nation, they blatantly 
omitted the cultural traces of collective identity, which could be considered 
as Yugoslav. As we show next, it was within this context that the “erasure” 
could and did take place. We also argue that it is only by considering this 
wider political and ideological context of transition “towards democracy” 
that the collapse of the basic democratic mechanisms of protection of the 
legal state, and the violation of human rights can be explained.
2. The erased of Slovenia
The erased of Slovenia are a group of about 25,000 people, who were 
erased from the Registry of Permanent Residents of Slovenia in 1992. They 
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were citizens of other former republics of Yugoslavia, who had a registered 
permanent residence in Slovenia but did not acquire the citizenship of the 
Republic of Slovenia after its proclamation of independence. Thus, on 26 
February 1992 they were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Aliens Act, 
which led into deprivation of their former permanent resident status. They 
became foreigners, illegally living in Slovenia. In this way, they were left 
without political, economic and social rights. Slovenian authorities did in-
form residents that were not automatically moved to the newly formed 
civic body and that they must apply for the new Slovenian citizenship if 
they wished to acquire it. However, the authorities did not inform the resi-
dents that failure to obtain Slovenian citizenship would also result in the 
cancellation of permanent residence. In fact, the Aliens Act did not foresee 
a similar consequence, but since it did not provide either for the transitory 
status of the former Yugoslav nationals or for the automatic acquisition of 
alien status, the Ministry of Interior solved the legal gap by a decree stat-
ing that the records concerned should be transferred from the Permanent 
Residents Register to the Aliens Register.
When analysing the erasure phenomenon, the question that arises is 
how did the erasure occur and, more importantly, why was it possible? 
One would argue that the legal gap in the Aliens Act made the erasure 
possible. Since that gap had to be solved, the Ministry of Interior adopted 
a discriminatory decree. But the complexity of the erasure phenomenon can 
not be satisfactorily explained solely from a legal point of view.
The social atmosphere during the independence process was instru-
mental in the occurrence of the erasure. The newly established state, as 
demonstrated above, wanted to distinguish itself from its Balkan vicin-
ity as obviously as possible, which affected the process of formation of 
new Slovenian citizenship. In order to achieve national homogeneity, the 
newly established state nationalised the right to citizenship and thus put 
all ethnically non-Slovene residents in an inferior position. In this con-
text, the erased were easily labelled as the cultural Other, as unsuitable 
members of the new state. Their non-acquisition of Slovenian citizenship 
was understood as their lack of faith in the newly formed state; they were 
therefore labelled as traitors, aggressors and opponents of Slovenia. They 
remained representatives of the Balkans, from which Slovenia wanted to 
distinguish itself as radically as possible; therefore an explicit racist dis-
course emerged in order to separate us from them. As Vlasta Jalušič ob-
serves, various social spheres ideologically contributed to formation and 
conservation of the racist discourse with their indifference to discrimina-
tions. Although numerous officials encountered many erased persons, they 
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merely followed the discriminatory rules instead of notifying their supe-
riors about the illegalities (Jalušič, 2007). Moreover, prior to erasure, the 
erased had had their friends, acquaintances, neighbours and colleagues in 
Slovenia who largely became indifferent to the discriminations after the 
erasure and thus maintained the erased in their illegal status. Furthermore, 
the silence of the media played a significant role in keeping the erased in 
their marginal position (Lipovec Čebron, 2007). The society’s prevailing 
perception was that the erasure was a consequence of the normal function-
ing of the state, not its deviation, and especially that it was not caused 
intentionally and systematically. Vlasta Jalušič names this phenomenon 
organised innocence, which emerged as an attempt to avoid responsibility 
and to make it collective (Jalušič, 2003).
It was only in 1999 that the unconstitutional nature of the erasure was 
legally recognised by the Constitutional Court, which confirmed its judg-
ment in further court decisions. In its last judgment about the erasure, in 
2003, the Constitutional Court ordered the ministry to issue supplementary 
decisions for those erased that had by that time managed to obtain legal 
status on establishing their permanent residence in Slovenia as of 26 Febru-
ary 1992. It was only with the re-election of the centre-left government in 
2008 that the Constitutional Court judgment from 2003 was implemented. 
For the erased who had already obtained their legal status, the Ministry of 
the Interior issued supplementary decisions, establishing their permanent 
residence in Slovenia as of 26 February 1992. For the others, the ministry 
adopted a special act, which presents an opportunity for most of the erased 
to regain their permanent resident status. The adopted act is completely in 
line with the Constitutional Court’s decision but, therefore, some groups of 
erased persons have been left out. The act is based on individual treatment 
and it expects the erased to initiate proceedings, even though they them-
selves were not responsible for the erasure. Furthermore, the act does not 
regulate the indemnity questions nor does it assign the responsibility for the 
erasure (Kogovšek, 2007; Izbrisani..., 2010).
3.  The erasure as a representative study of some key theore-
tical concepts
Although the case of the erasure is not directly linked to the question of 
citizenship, it raises important questions related to nationalism, human 
rights, citizenship and the relation between the civic body and those who 
are left out of it. Therefore, in the following pages we will look at how 
these theoretical concepts are linked to the understanding of the phenom-
enon of the erasure.
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3.1. Human rights
Particularly interesting is the relation between the erased and the concept 
and practices of human rights. One assumes that human rights are the basic 
rights ascribed to a person by his birth, and it is thus practically impossible 
to lose them during a lifetime. The case of the erased proves that kind of 
thinking wrong. It is true that the erased (largely) did not lose their lives, 
as was the case for numerous people during the wars in the Balkans, but 
they did still lose their human rights, despite being alive. As shown next, 
that was possible because of the immanent connection between human and 
citizen rights.
In principle, human rights belong to all individuals with their birth, 
but they can be granted only by sovereign national states, this resulting in 
citizenship being the basis for accessing human rights. No other institution 
exists outside of the state that would ensure the individual’s fundamental 
rights. Therefore, the prevention of statelessness is one of the main princi-
ples in international law. The states are obliged to follow it when determin-
ing their civic body, since it is difficult to ensure human rights to those 
who find themselves without any kind of citizenship or permanent resident 
status. Their rights are easily violated, since there is no body or institu-
tion that would provide them. National states are thus the sole political 
units that can provide the only space where human rights can be exercised 
(Arendt, 1979).
The problem of those who lost their human rights or whose rights were 
violated is that they lost a place where they would be heard, where their 
opinion would be relevant and public. The most significant aspect of the 
loss of human rights is the loss of possibilities to be seen and heard, in the 
words of Hannah Arendt, “the deprivation of a place in the world which 
makes opinions significant and actions effective” (1979: 296). Individuals 
thus cease to be politically relevant creatures, they are left to be only hu-
mans, without any right to act or have an opinion. Therefore for Arendt, the 
person without citizenship or permanent resident status is the human rights 
person par excellence, because such an individual is entitled to those rights 
only, and not citizen or permanent resident rights. She states that “[w]e 
became aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to 
live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and 
a right to belong to some kind of organized community, only when millions 
of people emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights because 
of the new global political situation” (Arendt, 1979: 296–297).
The national state is therefore essential to ensuring legal and political 
equality and, thus, the protection of all rights. The states should establish a 
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legal system that protects the rights of everyone, regardless of the different 
nationalities, but instead the nation has often been privileged over the state, 
which causes a nation to dissolve into an anarchic multitude of privileged 
and underprivileged individuals. That was fatal for the minorities, for non-
members of the nation and for those who were left without any country. 
Statelessness or the loss of the citizenship became the basis of total loss of 
all rights (Jalušič, 2007). In the case of the erased, the non-acquirement of 
Slovene citizenship resulted in complete loss of human rights, since there 
was no state granting these rights to individuals. The erased were left with 
citizenship of a state in disintegration and without citizenship of the newly 
emerged state, thus, de facto, becoming stateless persons.
In her book exploring universal human rights and the idea of self-
determination, Seyla Benhabib writes that “[t]he right to have rights can be 
realized only in a political community in which we are judged not through 
the characteristics which define us at birth, but through our actions and 
opinions, by what we do and say and think” (Benhabib, 2004: 59).
Defining the civic body of the state, on the one hand, has always meant 
mass exclusion on the other. This way, modern nations have established 
territorially bounded national sovereignty, achieving internal homogeneity 
through dialectical definition of Others, who were excluded, dehumanised 
and left without any rights. Establishment of imperial sovereignty thus im-
plies the mutual normalisation and integration of exclusionary practices 
(Kurnik, 2007).
The newly formed Slovene civic body, which was defined by ethnic 
measures at the time of the creation of the independent state, left out those 
individuals who were not perceived as ethnically Slovene. This had a great 
impact on the group of the erased, since they were left outside the state’s 
protection. Wars in the other Yugoslav republics forced some of them to re-
turn to their ethnic origins, while others were ethnically Slovenian but vic-
tims of administrative procedures as well. They were perceived as nationals 
of some other state (Yugoslavia) that was in the process of disintegration 
and they did not posses any other nationality, therefore becoming stateless 
persons. They were thus completely excluded from society. It took a decade 
for them to be able to recognise their common position, to gain a voice in 
public and claim their own rights.
Since such exclusive principles are often connected to nationalistic doc-
trine, we take a short closer look here into the theories of nationalism. Na-
tionalism in its exclusive understanding was a crucial basis for the erasure to 
be possible, since the new state was perceived as the property of the Slov-
ene nation, ensuring the hegemonic position of the majority ethnic group.
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3.2. Nationalism
Nationalism has a relatively ambivalent nature; it can be characterised as a 
political movement willing to achieve protection of collective cultural and 
political rights, autonomy or self-determination, state ideology, or (most 
often) as an extreme emotion of hatred against foreigners, cultural exclusiv-
ism and xenophobia. Reasons for such plurality of perception lie in the ina-
bility of scholars of nationalism to distinguish between the two dimensions 
of nationalism. On one hand we have “traditional” nationalism that argues 
for a state/country for every nation; the nation-state has to belong to its 
ethno-cultural or political group to protect its interests (culture, traditions, 
heritage and territory) and enable it to flourish. This form of nationalism is 
perceived as “classic nationalism” that most thrived in 19th century Europe 
and later spread around the world like an epidemic, even today marking 
some contemporary nationalisms. That was the case of Slovene national-
ism in the 1990s, when the state formation was based on the nation-state 
perception, the newly formed state being perceived as the protector of the 
majority ethnic group, i.e. the Slovenes. Smith (2001: 12) clearly states that 
nation is not a state, because the concept of a state refers to an institutional, 
structural activity, while the nation indicates the type of community. Simi-
larly, according to Smith, the nation is not an ethnic community (although 
they partly overlap, being members of the same family of phenomena, e.g. 
collective cultural identities) because “the ethnic community usually has no 
political referent, and in many cases lacks a public culture and even a ter-
ritorial dimension, since it is not necessary for an ethnic community to be 
in physical possession of its historic territory” (Smith, 2001: 12).
There are strong debates among scholars about when the nation and 
nationalism emerged in human history. Are they truly ancient phenomena 
as primordialists claim or something completely new, potentially associated 
with industrialisation, standardisation of language, mass literacy, or maybe 
a political consequence of the American and French revolutions as modern-
ists believe. Another theoretical position, ethno-symbolism, offered by An-
thony D. Smith, as the internal critic of modernism, claims that nationalism 
and the nation-state are phenomena of modernity, but that we can identify 
some pre-existing criteria (traditions, myths, and another ethno-symbolic 
attributes that existed before the emergence of modern nation-state). At first 
glance, this unsolvable situation can be demonstrated by Gellner’s stressing 
that “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it 
invents nations where they do not exist” (1964: 169), and Smith’s response 
that “nations and nationalism are no more ‘invented’ than other kinds of 
culture, social organization or ideology” (1991: 71).
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In a similar way, Smith rejects some other conceptions of national-
ism, for instance, the claim that nationalism is “by nature” an extreme 
force. Smith says that this is true to some degree, but we also know some 
rather moderate and democratic nationalism (Czech, Catalan, Quebecois) 
demonstrating that generalisation is not appropriate. In many cases this is 
true, but there are other nationalist movements that address their appeal to 
collective, cultural and minority human rights. Many see nationalism as the 
key source of destabilisation, and such argument is seen by nationalism as 
a destructive and destabilising factor. Again, in most cases this is true, but 
nationalism is not responsible per se for the collapse of states; nationalism 
usually develops on the ruins of existing states (Smith, 1995: 152). The 
destructive power of nationalism is the other side of the coin, as the first 
side is uniting – depending on the reference frame. Smith says that modern 
nationalisms have become what religious communities used to be in the 
past (nationalism as secularised religion), “communities of history and des-
tiny that confer on mortals a sense of immortality through the judgement 
of posterity, rather than through divine judgement in an afterlife” (Smith, 
1995: 158–159). In this regard also, Slovene nationalism played the same 
dual role – on the one hand, it was used to homogenise the nation and 
played an important role in the strengthening of national identity, but, on 
the other, it was used to made a division between “true members” and oth-
ers, especially other Yugoslav nationals.
As mentioned above, most people connect the idea of nationalism to 
ethnocentrism and racism, and violence and hatred against outside groups 
(Lichtenberg, 1997: 158). In their opinion, nationalism is an evil we must 
overcome and replace with cosmopolitanism. On the other hand, the idea 
on nationalism offers some positive connotations like attachment to de-
mocracy, community, autonomy, aspiring for freedom and preservation of 
cultures, languages and traditions. Regardless of its ratings, one can solidly 
claim that nationalism is (still) powerful, it is addressing the masses and 
responding to the aspirations of many communities. Doing this, national-
ism is greatly supported by (rational) arguments, usually referring to a) the 
right to self-determination (the self-determination argument), b) the right 
to prosperity, arguing that every man needs to identify with some broader 
community, bigger than his or her family (the prosperity argument), c) the 
right to redress those collective injustices that were committed in the past 
(the reparation argument), d) the view that the world is a better place if it 
possesses diverse cultures (the plurality argument), and e) the view claim-
ing that the existence of a distinctive culture requires its preservation and 
its flourishing, that every culture has its specific value, so it is legitimate 
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to preserve it (the inner value argument) (Lichtenberg, 1997: 160–161). 
Although the author is resisting the arguments of nationalism, she is not 
successful in her mission since she is not offering any alternative to the 
nationalist(ic) imagining of the world. She notes that every culture will 
not reach the final stage of self-determination, the independent state, yet it 
is, however, possible to use different policies of multiculturalism in multi-
cultural communities (promotion of minority languages and other cultural 
practices) to achieve peaceful co-existence. In this sense, only multicultur-
alism is the answer, and the politics of recognition that takes from nation-
alism what is acceptable and directs it to more cosmopolitan ways (Lich-
tenberg, 1997: 172).
For some years, Slovene nationalism was perceived mainly in the posi-
tive perspective, especially in regard to nationalisms in other former Yu-
goslav republics that lead into devastating wars, which was not the case 
in Slovenia. Still, the phenomenon of the erasure reveals the other side of 
Slovene nationalism, which was exclusive and hostile to the perceived non-
members. Therefore, we argue that further studies of Slovene nationalism 
should always take into account the erasure as the other side of the coin of 
the disintegration and state-building processes in the 1990s.
The legal consequences of the erasure were directly linked to the lack 
of citizenship status, which was the basis for deprivation of political, eco-
nomic and social rights. The erased thus form part of those de facto state-
less persons who open up many dilemmas about nationality, nationalism 
and citizenship. Due to numerous questions that remain unanswered when 
granting citizenship, and when including and excluding from the civic bod-
ies of national states, and various discriminatory practices brought about by 
the modern conception of citizenship, thoughts about a broader notion of 
citizenship emerged, considering new opportunities that broader, transna-
tional or global citizenship might open for today’s excluded individuals.
3.3. Forms of citizenship
Some languages distinguish citizenship from nationality, where citizenship 
stands for “legal relationship, regulating the totality of mutual rights and 
duties that may exist between an individual and a state” (Horn, 1998, cited 
in Dedić, 2003: 25–26), and is referred to domestic legal order. According 
to Dedić (2003: 26), nationality stands for “the legal relationship between 
an individual and a state in international law”, a state thus granting diplo-
matic protection to its nationals. In languages that use only the term na-
tionality, it often contains a notion of ethnic affiliation, which is common 
in Central and Eastern Europe. However, as Dedić observes, the European 
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Convention on Nationality perceives nationality as “the legal relationship 
between an individual and a state, not reflecting ethnic origin of the indi-
vidual” (Dedić, 2003: 26).
As explained above, national citizenship as a paradigm for interpreta-
tion of the relationship between the citizen and the individual non-citizen 
in the political community envisages that citizen rights overlap human 
rights. In Europe, the possibility to overcome national citizenship system 
is brought forward by the introduction of European citizenship, whose body 
is difficult to determine, since that depends on the way in which Europe 
and European Union are defined. In addition, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 
defined the EU citizen as every individual holding the nationality of a 
Member State. EU citizenship thus complements national citizenship and 
does not replace it. Therefore, the legal function of national citizenship 
remained unchanged. Currently, a European citizen is anyone who has the 
nationality of a Member State. This way, instead of exceeding the limits of 
national citizenship, the European Union has created a new discrimination 
(Rethinking European Citizenship, 2003; Tuccillo Castaldo, 2007; Balibar, 
2004).
Despite the idea of Europe overcoming the dividing line between sov-
ereign national states, it seems that the European Union as a political entity 
has included both elements: the nation and the state. Thus, by not over-
coming national citizenship systems and expanding the “right of residency” 
(ius soli), which would enable real citizenship on the basis of residing in 
Europe, the European Union has created a new discrimination. Third coun-
try immigrants are now discriminated not only by national states, in which 
they settle, but also by the European Union. Immigrants are radically dis-
cerned to be those from other member countries and those from countries 
outside the EU, the so-called “third” countries (Balibar, 2004). Tuccillo 
Castaldo (2007) argues that the EU enlargement includes several levels of 
exclusion. The EU’s external borders are expanding largely with the aim 
to monitor migration flows, while supervision over inferiorised populations 
is becoming harsher within the EU. Moreover, citizenship legislation is 
evolving in a way that naturalisation processes are increasingly determined 
by economic-income criteria and, at the same time, the ius sanguinis princi-
ple is becoming more and more relevant. Foreigners have become second-
class citizens (Balibar, 2004: 171), who are often stigmatised, their stay and 
activity being strictly controlled. The European citizenship that would be 
granted to the erased on the basis of their residence in the European Union 
(after Slovenia’s accession) would provide them with legal status and their 
human rights. But since European citizenship functions only as the exten-
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sion of existing citizenships, the erased could not become European citizens 
without Slovene citizenship, thus being discriminated again.
Citizenship is to be understood in the broader social context, not only 
as a legal category. Balibar (1988: 724) understands citizenship in a narrow 
sense as “full exercise of political rights” and in a broader sense as “cul-
tural initiative or effective presence in the public space (the capacity to be 
‘listened to’ there)”. These two tendencies, to equate citizenship to national-
ity on the one hand, and to consider citizenship solely as legal fiction on 
the other, were differently balanced throughout history. But Balibar warns 
that the dynamic relation between the citizen and the state is overlooked 
in both cases and therefore talks about “worksites of citizenship” (2004: 
198), thus exposing the dynamic link between the state and the individual. 
Balibar argues that it is necessary to find a new type of citizenship that 
will overcome its bonds today to a national state. Citizenship is namely 
a process, formed by those who invoke the right to be citizens. In addi-
tion, the citizenship we know today was created through historical battles 
and struggles that will also be needed in the future. As an alternative to 
today’s citizenship, Balibar introduces the term droit de cité (the right to 
citizen rights), which facilitates the distinction between formal citizenship 
and citizenship practices, and represents firm liberalisation of the right of 
residence and work. At the same time, it grants inclusiveness and expan-
siveness of citizenship as collective emancipation, thus representing a kind 
of driving force, which opens and broadens the boundaries of existing citi-
zenship institutions. Citizenship is not only given from above but is largely 
constituted from below, which empowers active citizenship. Therefore, the 
project of opening borders is based on the basic participation of those who 
invoke droit de cité, even though they are not formally citizens of a par-
ticular nation-state (Balibar, 2004).
Modern citizenship contains two important deviations from the prin-
ciples of universality, inclusiveness and democracy. The first deviation is 
the distinction between passive and active citizenship, respectively between 
congenital equal and inalienable rights on the one hand, and participation 
in decision-making on modalities of their implementation on the other. The 
second deviation is the relation between rights and nationality by birth. 
Therefore, the arrival of a foreigner or a refugee suspends the image of 
the national state as the one capable of granting human and citizen rights 
(Kurnik, 2007).
Global citizenship is another alternative to national state citizenship. It 
is even vaguer than European citizenship, since global citizens (in contrast 
to the European citizens as one of the post/trans-national categories) are not 
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a legal category, and one can only imagine their existence and functioning 
as a kind of informal association of like-minded persons. Because there is 
no such thing as a global bureaucracy or a global government that would 
protect global citizens, they can simply live and work within transnational 
frames, denying and avoiding national borders and national sovereignty. 
Steenbergen proposes more than just a technical definition of a global citi-
zen as he describes him in more holistic terms: individuals get to choose 
where they work and live and are no longer attached to (their) state or 
location where they were born (Steenbergen, 1994: 138). In the age when 
power was in the hands of ethnic and exclusivist models of nationalism, 
the political discourse of global citizenship was nevertheless on the rise 
(Carter, 1997).
The concept of global citizenship, originating in cosmopolitan values, 
is based on early Western thought and was articulated during the Enlighten-
ment. Interests in this concept have recently risen, since the world is facing 
increasing global integration, environmental interdependence and the infor-
mation revolution. International organisations (mostly non-governmental) 
have achieved that individuals share a greater responsibility for tragedies, 
wars, pollution and other global problems, even when they do not happen 
in the immediate vicinity, but on the other side of the world. The debate 
on global citizenship is at the same time an extension of the renewed de-
bate about the role and power of citizenship within the state. In the eyes 
of many, the two concepts (global and national citizenship) exclude one 
another, because they supposedly address and defend contradicting posi-
tions (the former – universal values and moral duties towards the whole 
humanity, and the latter – values and duties towards a specific community, 
culture or state). From the perspective of nationalism and the nation-state, 
cosmopolitanism seems to be shallow, since it lacks rooting in a specific 
and identifiable community. According to nationalism, cosmopolitanism ad-
dresses too abstract and unreal universalistic requirements for duties. On the 
other hand, the cosmopolitan view perceives nationalism as narrow-minded, 
exclusive, xenophobic and intolerant towards the rights of all who do not 
fall under the umbrella term of a national community (Carter, 1997).
Although it seems at the first glance that there is a conflict between 
nationalism and global citizenship, the conflict between political affilia-
tion to a specific country and the ideals of global citizenship is in fact not 
necessary. Neither does the pride of a specific culture and identity exclude 
more universal feelings of global belonging. As Carter says (1997), it is 
possible to find some forms of nationalism that are compatible with the 
original cosmopolitanism, especially for those who express commitment to 
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universalistic political principles, namely liberalism and republicanism and 
who accept responsibility beyond national borders.
Despite that fact, that there are concepts and hopes to form a post-na-
tional citizenship that would be based solely on human rights, the national 
states remaining the only entities that only provide space, where human 
rights can be not only exercised but also advocated for all the excluded. 
Given that the realisation of human rights in everyday life often coincides 
with citizenship status and a residence permit, it is of vital importance to 
defend the right to citizenship.
How is the above discussion on citizenship relevant to our case? In 
Slovenia, the case of the erasure showed the importance of citizenship sta-
tus, since many of the erased became de facto stateless persons. National 
citizenship was not granted to the erased, since they were not perceived as 
being a part of the newly formed state. With the entry of Slovenia into the 
European Union, there were some hopes that European citizenship might be 
granted to all residents of the Union. But since European citizenship was 
only an addition to the national one, joining to the European Union meant 
another exclusion for the erased, since they were deprived of two citizen-
ships from then on. A wider notion of citizenship – national, European 
or global – that would be based on the individual’s residence or activity 
or other citizenship practices, would significantly contribute to solving the 
problem of stateless persons.
4. What about Europeanisation?
Key question that the researchers of modern Slovene political history have 
been trying to answer for the last twenty years is about detecting the as-
pirations that have led the Slovene independence movement. The dilemma 
is the following: firstly, was the independent state only a means for the 
democratisation that was not possible within the frame of Yugoslavia, or 
was the democratisation an “excuse” to gain independence? And secondly, 
was the formation of the independent state a consequence of the wish to 
join the European Union, as democratisation was the necessary condition 
to achieve this goal, or was democratisation the elementary wish and goal 
that would automatically lead to Europeanisation?
The posed questions can be answered by strictly following the process 
of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the decisions of the Slovene political 
(and also cultural and intellectual) elites, who led the process of the Slovene 
independence. We could argue that in the late 1980s, the Yugoslav republic 
of Slovenia truly wished for the democratisation of Yugoslavia. When accept-
ing the ignorance of such aspirations among the Yugoslav leadership, it took 
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the following steps (free elections, new democratic legislation, etc.) that led 
to the formation of the independent state of Slovenia. However, at the cru-
cial moment of the independence process we can observe a rupture between 
forces that were focusing on the independence and the state-building proc-
esses, and forces whose primary goal was democratisation. What both had in 
common was the aspiration to join the European community at the shortest 
possible notice, since it represented a promise of economical development 
and a guardian of fundamental democratic standards. Therefore, Europeanisa-
tion was once again, similarly to the process of independence, seen as a self-
evident transition to a presumably higher level of democracy. The adherence 
to the European Union meant a final confirmation of Slovenia’s European 
identity and its most visible distinction from other former Yugoslav states. 
That became even more obvious with the accession to the Schengen space, 
when, according to Vidmar Horvat, a new era of negotiations on European 
identity and the identity of Europe began. Schengen Europe caused a redefi-
nition of the hierarchies of inclusion and exclusion (Vidmar Horvat, 2009). 
Slovenia found itself on the “right” side, but the erased were once again “left 
out of democracy”. The independence of Slovenia led them to a stateless 
position and the Europeanisation brought them even further exclusions.
This immanent anti-democratic link between independence and Euro-
peanisation is even more traumatic considering how Europeanisation was 
perceived among the erased as a process that would finally end the injus-
tices caused by the Slovenian state, but the reality did not bring any direct 
solution. In the European Union, the erasure was not perceived as an obsta-
cle for the accession of Slovenia. As Shaw states in her study about citizen 
regimes in South Eastern Europe, EU institutions did not utilise Slovenia’s 
pre-accession process in order to force progress in relation to the erasure, 
even though it has been characterised as a serious human rights violation 
by organizations such as Amnesty International and the Commissioner for 
Human Rights at the Council of Europe (Shaw, 2010). The erased, who 
did not possess Slovene citizenship, were not granted European citizen-
ship, thus remaining stateless. Nevertheless, the erased have spread aware-
ness of the problem to some European institutions, thus taking advantage 
of the new source of political pressure on the Slovenian authorities. They 
succeeded with their law suit before the European Court of Human Rights, 
which is obliging Slovenia to grant the erased their human rights. Follow-
ing (or not) the judgment of the court, it will be the indicator of the de-
mocratisation and Europeanisation of Slovenia in the near future, and a test 
for the European Union to overcome its double standards when defending 
human rights. Since “the rather hidden fate of the Erased failed to make 
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a substantial dent in the overall success rate of Slovenia, which has been 
widely seen in international spheres as the only success story of the disso-
lution of Yugoslavia and a deserving member of the ‘2004 team’ – i.e. the 
first post-1989 enlargement of the EU towards Central and Eastern Europe” 
(Shaw, 2010: 22), the acceptance of the European Court’s decision will put 
Slovenia’s democratic standards and European values to the test.
Many studies of new democracies claim that the international context 
may influence transitions (toward democracy). As Rizman puts it, “the 
Eastern and Central European countries had never before known more fa-
vorable conditions for change and, in terms of democratic consolidation, 
had never seen a combination of international factors more conductive to 
that process” (Rizman, 2006: 151). However, we might argue that this in-
ternational influence did not successfully influence Slovenia when it was 
dealing with the erased (prior to and after becoming a member of the EU 
and other international organizations) to redress fully the injustices that 
took place almost twenty years ago.
Conclusion
The process of disintegration of the federal state and the re-nationalisation 
of Slovenia as an independent state, presented a state-building process that 
was much more peaceful than similar processes in other former Yugoslav 
republics. Nevertheless, the emergence of (ethnic) nationalism inflicted 
some large gaps in Slovene democracy, the biggest among them being the 
act of the erasure. To explain this phenomenon and to place it into the 
socio-historical context, we cannot avoid the theoretical reflection of the 
key concepts that characterise state-building – namely nationalism, human 
rights, and the theory and practice of citizenship. With the attempt to shed 
light on certain theoretical factors in the studies of citizenship, nationalism 
and human rights we seek for the details to explain the circumstances of 
the erasure and to place it into a broader theoretical frame as a key exam-
ple of the contemporary dilemmas in theoretical research. The process of 
democratisation in Slovenia was widely seen as the only success story of 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and its accession to the European Union in 
2004 was perceived as a well deserved reward.
In the process of state-building, the ethnonationalist approach in con-
ceptions of citizenship was applied. Instead of models of multiculturalism 
and cosmopolitanism as the moral imperatives of the European Community, 
the most desired destination of a newly independent state, the creation of 
independent Slovenia was based on the ethnic model of (re)nationalisation. 
With the protection of “indigenous”, “autochthonous”, “historic” minorities, 
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Slovenia met the political criteria (and the desire to prove its democratic 
orientation to the international community), while completely ignoring the 
so-called new minorities that had emerged in decades of living in the com-
mon Yugoslav state.
Moreover, the erased were not only not granted minority rights, their 
legal status was completely denied. As a result of not obtaining Slovene 
citizenship, they were deprived of their permanent resident status, which 
caused a complete loss of their rights. They became stateless persons, with-
out any of the rights that are granted by the nation states. As we have 
explained, they lost their basic “right to have rights”, causing their total 
disappearance from the public sphere. As the phenomenon of the erasure 
shows, the current national citizenship is not an appropriate model for grant-
ing individual rights. As we have pointed out, citizenship should therefore 
evolve, taking the form of a European or even a global category.
Europeanisation is the process that is most vital today. To join the 
European Union, Slovenia had to meet some requirements, also concerning 
the state of democracy. However, the issue of the erased was overlooked 
in the process of Europeanisation of Slovenia. The European Union did 
not use the pre-accession process to force Slovenia to solve the question 
of the erased. Thus, for the erased, both democratisation and Europeanisa-
tion were therefore only “empty words”, leaving them without any political 
protection. The erasure being the main hole in Slovenian perforated democ-
racy, it can serve as an indicator – in theoretical terms – of the ambiguities 
and contingencies that define the outcome of the processes of Slovenian 
democratisation and Europeanisation.
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U radu se istražuje procese dezintegracije Jugoslavije, proces izgradnje države 
u Sloveniji i kontekst specifičnoga fenomena – brisanja, koji se zbio u Sloveni-
ji ranih devedesetih godina 20. stoljeća. Rekonstruiraju se društveno-povijesni 
i politički konteksti, u kojima je došlo do neovisnosti Slovenije. Opisivanjem 
procesa izgradnje države, procesa demokratizacije i dvojbi glede zaštite manjina 
u Sloveniji – uključujući razliku između priznatih »autohtonih« i nepriznatih 
»novih« manjina – utire se put teorijskoj i sociološkoj raspravi o »izbrisanima«. 
Teorijska rasprava temelji se na pitanjima ljudskih prava, nacionalizma i građan-
stva, kako u njihovoj klasičnoj (nacionalnodržavnoj) koncepciji tako i u njihovim 
alternativnim oblicima poput globalnoga građanstva. Sociološki, rasprava »bri-
sanje« smiješta u širi okvir istraživanja procesa demokratizacije i europeizacije, 
osvetljujući tako ključne čimbenike koji su prouzročili perforiranu demokraciju 
u Sloveniji tijekom dvadeset godina njezine neovisnosti.
Ključne riječi: dezintegracija države, izgradnja države, europeizacija, izbrisani 
Slovenije, demokratizacija, ljudska prava, građanstvo (građanski status)
